the cedar falls on Lebanon
Earlier this week Hezbollah was granted the right to keep its ‘arms’ by the new Lebanese government but contrary to umpteen UN resolutions. Jerusalem Post:
Lebanon’s new government Wednesday endorsed Hizbullah’s right to keep its weapons, the latest sign that the group has no intention of meeting a UN resolution calling for it to disarm. (…) All 30 cabinet ministers voted Wednesday to approve the policy statement that endorses Hizbullah’s right to keep its weapons. Five ministers from the pro-Western majority expressed “reservations” over the clause addressing Hizbullah, but did not vote against it.
The policy statement – which lays out the government’s goals for the next four years – illustrates how the government is loath to take any strong action against Hizbullah for fear of sparking a crisis. The group has virtual veto power over the government’s moves, most analysts believe, because sectarian violence could follow if it pulls out.
Many fear a renewed outbreak of the sectarian violence seen in 2008, when Hizbullah gunmen swept through Sunni neighborhoods of Beirut to briefly seize control after the government moved to curb the group’s military communications network. More than 80 people were killed in the violence that followed, pushing the country to the brink of civil war.
The threat of civil war is like a nagging cough that never entirely leaves the Lebanese body politic – this policy move grants legitimacy to Hezbollah’s deadly arsenal but does not absolve or offer a shield to the Lebanese government from any unilateral action Hezbollah chooses to take with its arsenal. If anything, the government is now implicit in any unilateral actions Hezbollah undertakes to make. Some point to Hezbollah’s new manifesto – (the first update since the mid-80’s) as evidence of Hezbollah’s political maturity and marks Hezbollah as more pragmatic and distinctly Lebanese quasi-political movement. Although, there are those who beg to differ. The Jerusalem Post:
It is correct that the new manifesto does not include the previous document’s call for the establishment of an “Islamic Republic” in Lebanon. But here an interesting discrepancy emerges. The longer, Arabic version of the manifesto is steeped in religious rhetoric and Islamist terminology. Nasrallah opens his statement with two quotations from the Koran. The manifesto’s first section refers to “resistance in the way of jihad,” and the “jihadi way.” The section dealing with “Palestinian resistance” depicts Hizbullah as practicing “jihadi resistance.” The section dealing with Iran notes the “blessed Islamic revolution led by the Vali al-Faqih Imam Khomeini.” (The latter phrase refers to the system of government operative in Iran, Vilayat al-Faqih – rule of the jurisprudent, i.e., clerical rule.) The section on “resistance” deals with the movement’s “mujihadeen and its martyrs.”
The Arabic version of the manifesto also contains a whole section entitled “Jerusalem and the Aksa Mosque,” which asserts that “to liberate Jerusalem and defend Aksa Mosque” is a “religious duty” incumbent on Muslims.
But in the English-language version of the manifesto, the section on Jerusalem, and all the phrases mentioned above, do not appear. The English version, indeed, is innocent of all reference to jihad or Koranic quotation. On Al-Manar, it is not made clear that the English version contains only selected excerpts from the manifesto. On the regime-supported Syrian News Station Web site, meanwhile, the English version is presented as the “full text of Hizbullah’s new political document.”
The discrepancies suggest that Hizbullah considers it in its interest to tone down or remove the pro-Iranian and jihadi parts of its identity when presenting itself to the outside world. But the full document in its original form suggests that the movement has not strayed far from its original path.
The new manifesto contains a call for the ending of the sectarian system of political representation in Lebanon. This is the final aspect cited by those asserting that Hizbullah is undergoing a process of moderation. But this does not represent a concession on Hizbullah’s part. The movement believes, possibly correctly, that the Shi’a community has a long-term demographic advantage in Lebanon. Ending Lebanon’s consociational system is therefore intended, in the fullness of time, to deliver the country into its hands.
There was a joke Lebanese told themselves during war with Israel in 2006 which went like this; Lebanon is Hezbollah and the rest of us our just tourists. From where I stand in 2009, it is evident the Cedar Revolution has failed and the joke isn’t even remotely humorous any more but sadly true.

